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Abstract 
This article addresses the issue of the development of national science policies in OECD 
countries in the 1960s. It argues that the Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) acted as a policy innovator playing a central role in the development 
and adoption of what we call the “OECD model of science policy-making”. Through a 
detailed analysis of the OECD country reviews, we reveal the OECD model and its seven key 
functions: horizontal coordination and advice, planning and budgeting, priority-setting, 
resources allocation and administration. Through analysis of OECD archives, we extract the 
reasons why OECD changed its role and the absence of a reference point against which to 
benchmark national situations. It highlights the ways the pre-existing mode of operation of 
OECD, centred on country reviews and peer pressure, was modified, and how effective these 
changes have been in the diffusion of the model among OECD members.  
Keywords: Policy-making; Science and Technology policy; OECD  
1. Introduction 
Research systems in OECD countries witnessed an important development in the first half of 
the last century culminating in the increasing role played by science during World War II. The 
professionalization of science and the scale of public investment gave a national dimension to 
science and research systems. The dynamics of nationalisation of science were, however, not 
followed by explicit national science policies, as research governance and funding remained 
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distributed among multiple actors at the intermediate level. OECD countries will only start to 
adopt ‘national’ science policies with corresponding ministers and departments in the early 
1960s. While the intervention of OECD has been acknowledged in this movement, little is 
known on its role. 
OECD is probably the least studied international organisation. It is only recently that scholars 
have started to consider the role of OECD in transnational governance. Such work has 
analysed its ways of working, and in particular the critical role of the ‘peer’ review process 
(Woodward, 2009; Pagani, 2002). However, they have only focused on OECD traditional 
areas of intervention (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Porter and Webb, 2008; Martens 
and Jakobi, 2010). The role of OECD in the field of science and technology policies has 
remained untouched, with one notable exception, the extensive historical work done by Godin 
on the role of OECD in standardizing the measurement of S&T effort (Godin, 2002, 2004a, 
2004b, 2006, 2009). There is however an important difference between science and the other 
domains covered by OECD. Most countries did not have ‘national’ science policies as such at 
the time OECD started to address this policy issue (King, 2001). Our aim in this paper is 
therefore to understand the role of OECD in the generalised adoption of science policies by 
OECD member countries in the 1960s.  
Our assumption is that OECD played a central role by developing a de facto model for 
science policy-making and by generating, country by country, processes fostering its 
implementation. As with other domains, the central mechanisms were the construction of a 
transnational arena, the domain committee of national practitioners, and the use of country 
reviews. This study combines an analysis of OECD reports on science policy (two major 
documents issued in 1963 and 1971) with an in-depth study of the recommendations 
contained by the first national ‘science policy reviews’ done on each country (16 reviews of 
17 countries, and all major countries reviewed during the 1960s). On this basis we can 
identify which we propose to label the ‘OECD model of science policy making’ which we 
characterise in terms of seven main functions (presented in section 4).  
To better understand the initial situation in OECD countries and the role played by OECD, 
archive research analysed the corpus of data associated with the functioning of the OECD 
directorate of scientific affairs and of the two successive committees that organised the 
involvement of national practitioners; the Committee for scientific research, followed from 
1966 onwards by the Committee for science policy. This enabled us to identify the 
‘modifications’ made to the prevailing OECD approach (to follow A. King, the first head of 
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the directorate, in his retrospective contribution, 2001). The first modification (examined in 
section 2), central to our argument, is that reviews, contrary to work in other domains, had no 
‘point of reference’ against which to benchmark the country under review. OECD could not 
thus play its traditional role as an “ideational agent” (Marcussen, 2001) and transformed itself 
into a policy innovator, mobilising a very different approach to the reviews and their 
discussion by the committee  (the so-called “confrontation meetings”). Section 3 explains the 
changes in this role and presents the mechanisms adopted in order to promote the adoption of 
national science policies by member countries. This promotion was based upon a “model of 
science policy making” presented in section 4. To better appraise the effective role of OECD, 
two sections examine the diffusion of the model. Section 5 is centred on the effective 
diffusion of the functions that compose the model, while section 6 analyses the five factors, 
which, in our view, explain its rapid diffusion in OECD member states. Section 7 concludes 
that the very unique situation facing the OECD may well explain why this role and mode of 
operation have since disappeared and are largely ignored in studies of the OECD at large. 
2. No Science policy-making model was available for diffusion before the 
1960s  
National S&T policies were a creation of the 1960s. While public interventions supporting 
science were in existence at this time, they were not constituted as a national public policy in 
the same way as defence, public utilities, agriculture, or industry were already at that time.  
Support to research has evolved without organised national support over several centuries, 
from the Renaissance period, when princes and kings were the main supporters of savants 
(Mokyr, 2002) onwards. The professionalization of research materialised in the nineteenth 
century, with the establishment of research laboratories in public and private sectors in 
multiple domains, supported by philanthropy, business and governments (Dahan and Pestre, 
2004; Mokyr, 2002; Rosenberg and Mowery, 1993; Ben-David and Sullivan, 1975). These 
laboratories, in sectors like agriculture, extraction industries, construction and public health, 
expanded in number and size in the first half of the twentieth century, and included new 
laboratories for cooperative research (Mowery, 1983; Hart, 1998). Research Councils 
emerged at the same time to sponsor research in addition to direct Government, private and 
non-profit support of their laboratories. They were public and semi-public organisations, 
governed autonomously by scientists (Braun, 1998; Guston, 2000). Research councils and the 
old academies of sciences, from the enlightenment period, constituted an intermediary layer, 
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acting on behalf of Governments in distributing funds to research performers and in setting 
directions to research (Rip, 1994). 
The evolutionary process of the “nationalisation of science” in the first half of the last century 
changed the scale and scope of research systems (Dahan and Pestre, 2004: 19). Their main 
components – higher education, government laboratories, business laboratories and non-profit 
laboratories – were already in place (Bernal, 1939, Bush 1945). However there were few 
interactions within and between sectors, and with a low level of complexity.  
At the time of the first OECD Ministerial Conference on Science in 1963, the intervention of 
Governments in science was not even consensual among its members. The reports on the 
organisation of the research systems and science policy prepared for the conference by 
member countries, (OECD, 1963b) reveal that only five countries had even the seeds of a 
national science policy (Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands). A number of countries expressed doubts about the components of a national 
policy, as outlined by the OECD in the structure of the report. The main criticism was around 
the need for a central authority responsible for coordinating national policy. Some reports 
were highly sceptical on the possibility to design and implement a national plan for scientific 
issues, and on the ability of Governments to set priorities. Positions were also taken in a 
number of countries both for and against the idea of a new organisation in charge of the 
allocation of resources beyond research councils. Although Germany already had a Federal 
Minister for Science, the German report expressed concerns on centralised coordination: 
“With all these considerations the question must be raised whether an individual institution is 
at all able to draw up an ‘overall plan’ in a country of the size of the Federal Republic, in 
which the scientific sphere is of such great diversity. A question which should also not be 
disregarded is that whether such a central plan – even if prepared with the greatest expert 
knowledge – would be in the best interest of science” (OECD, 1963b, German report: 5). The 
Dutch report, on the other hand, takes a clear position in favour of the central role of research 
councils: “The view that the allocation of funds and establishment of priorities should be left 
to the scientists themselves” (OECD, 1963b, Dutch report: 2). However, resistance to the idea 
of a national policy for science was expressed by the Dutch Minister of Education to the 
OECD Secretary General, who considered the idea of linking science to economic 
development as a “prostitution of science” (cited by King, 2001: 343). 
Despite the widespread belief that American research policy and the recommendations of the 
Bush report were the archetype model for S&T policy-making, this was not the case in 
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practice. The American system is a pluralistic one, with multiple visions and agencies 
combining research performance with allocation of resources. It is founded on mission-
oriented agencies like the National Institutes of Health for public health or the Department of 
Energy for energy. In addition, it is a system chiefly driven by security planning and priority 
given to large defence programmes without a civilian counterpart (Hart, 1998). The National 
Science Foundation, a pillar in the Bush report, had the principal responsibility for sponsoring 
basic research in academia (Brooks, 1986). As David Hart (1998) shows, in early times, the 
American Government intervened in science only through standardization, patent protection 
and anti-trust policies. Historians of science policy in the United States also showed that in 
the last century all proposals for a centralized authority for S&T were rejected. The dominant 
ideas in the American system favoured private support and patronage over Government 
intervention and regulation. Analysts identify two main reasons for these repeated failures. 
The first, according to Smith (1990), is the American Constitution inspired by the principles 
of Frances Bacon transmitted to the founders by Joseph Priestley; and the second is the 
opposition of the Congress to any centralised and coordinated model (Hart, 1998). Although 
proposed many times (since 1880), a Department of Science does not exist in the United 
States. Most policy-making functions are also absent in the American model. The proposal in 
the Bush report to become institutionalized is the competitive allocation of resources through 
projects selected by the peer review system (Guston and Keniston, 1994). 
3. OECD as a policy innovator in S&T 
The OECD has always been recognised as an influential actor in most areas of public policy.  
This is also the case for science and technology policy (Elzinga and Jamison, 1995; Godin, 
2004b; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Porter and Webb, 2008; Martens and Jakobi, 
2010). However, the impact on S&T policies has been different from those applied in other 
policy areas. This specificity is linked to the role of OECD as a policy innovator enabling the 
creation, diffusion and institutionalisation of national S&T policies.  
The OECD is the least known intergovernmental organisation and is seen as elusive 
(Woodward, 2009). Recently, scholars have devoted more attention to OECD, in particular to 
its governance and to its role in the diffusion of policy-making processes and practices. 
However, its action on science and technology policy is rarely studied or referred to in recent 
analyses (e.g. Martens and Jacobi, 2010; Woodward, 2009; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006; Marcussen, 2004). One notable exception is the extensive historical work done by B. 
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Godin on the role of OECD in standardizing the measurement of S&T effort (Godin, 2002), 
on the construction of S&T indicators (Godin, 2003, 2004a), on the development of concepts 
and of corresponding frameworks and policy narratives (Godin, 2004b, 2006, 2009).  
OECD action in transnational governance has been characterised in largely metaphorical 
terms. Marcussen (2001, 2004), on the one hand, characterises OECD as an ideational agent 
that generates ideas and concepts through the analysis and diffusion of knowledge. Porter and 
Webb (2008), on the other, highlight the role of OECD in promoting identity creation, 
through the ability to develop a space wherein actors collectively discuss ideas and share 
practices and knowledge. For science policies, Godin (2004b) likens OECD to a think-tank, 
and stresses its role in the effective construction of narratives, frameworks and discourses, 
which are then widely adopted.  
There is thus consensus in the literature regarding the role of OECD in the promotion of new 
ideas and concepts, in the diffusion of expert knowledge and in the circulation of best 
practices from leading countries, in particular North American ones (Martens and Jakobi, 
2010). The expectation has been, that, for science policy, OECD would keep the same 
approach and ways of working, and that, as for other sectoral policies, it would use the 
mechanism of annual reviews set by the Economic and Development Review Committee, 
EDRC, to assess the performance of member countries. However national policies in science 
were not in place at the time and there was thus no model to diffuse or against which to 
benchmark countries under review. To set science policy as an autonomous national policy, 
OECD had to reconsider its mode of intervention. Instead of diffusing best practices and 
tested policies, OECD transformed itself into a policy actor and, in cooperation with a close 
network of actors constructed a new model for policy-making in S&T. Before presenting this 
model, we analyse the conditions under which it was progressively developed. 
The idea for a national policy of science evolved from the work of the predecessor of OECD, 
the organisation in charge of administering the Marshal Plan for European reconstruction: the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), created in 19482. As with the 
other directorates, the Directorate for Scientific Affairs of OECD organised its work-
programme continuing the ideas and decisions approved by the OEEC Council. The smooth 
transition (Woodward, 2009:18) was consolidated in this case with the appointment of 
Alexander King, former director of the European Agency for Productivity of OEEC, to lead 
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the directorate. Immediately before the transition to the new organisation, the OEEC Council 
had recognised the importance of science in economic growth, created a high level science 
policy group, and approved the recommendation of the Wilgress report for member countries 
to implement a national science policy (referred in King, 2001). Following the 
recommendations of the ad-hoc group for science policy, the agenda of the new directorate 
for the 1960s was organised around the design and diffusion of the new policy (OECD, 1962). 
To achieve this aim, two actions were undertaken: the development of statistical work to 
collect data at the national level, and the analysis of the effectiveness of research (OECD, 
1966a). 
For the latter, the choice of the Directorate for Scientific Affairs was to adopt the methods and 
approaches in use in the other directorates of OECD, principally monitoring through peer 
reviewed country reports. The reviews, originally implemented by the Economic 
Development Research Council, were by then a well-accepted and respected approach. Their 
use had spread to other policy areas like agriculture or manpower policies (OECD, 1966a: 6; 
King, 2001). Because of the exploratory stage of policy formulation in scientific affairs, the 
Directorate decided to modify the standard approach and mechanisms, according to the 
Director at that time: “we felt that a modification of this practice to meet the needs of science 
policy would be a constructive device to this end” (King, 2001: 344).  
In the country reviews, OECD measures performance and analyses structural challenges 
facing a country against a shared benchmark and best practices (Woodward, 2009). The 
reviews aim at the improvement of policy-making and to insure compliance with best 
practices as well as the adoption of the standards and regulations recommended (Porter and 
Webb, 2008; Marcussen, 2004). The absence of an established and accepted reference 
framework to act as a yardstick (as named by Freeman (1995)) drove the Secretariat to change 
the aim of the review: in the science reviews the purpose was to help member countries to 
formulate their science policies in a “rational manner” (OECD, 1966a: 6). A similar change 
was introduced in the rhythm of reviews: instead of being systematically and periodically 
reviewed by the OECD in line with the standard mechanism, it was up to countries to express 
the wish to be reviewed, as part of the learning process (Pagani, 2002; King, 2001). 
The standard peer review process comprises three phases: the preparatory, consultation and 
assessment phases. At the end a final report is published by the OECD in agreement with the 
country (Pagani, 2002). The Directorate of Scientific Affairs adopted a similar process based 
on three phases. However it implemented it in a different manner assigning different roles to 
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actors in the consultation and assessment phases. The first phase of drafting a report on the 
country situation was quite similar in both processes. In this phase, the secretariat remained 
the principal actor in charge of collecting data and information and producing the draft of the 
report. However there were three major differences with the standard practice. The first 
difference lay in data collection. At the time, statistical data on science resources was scarce3. 
This may explain why the Secretariat did not send questionnaires to the authorities, a normal 
practice in standard reviews (Schäfer, 2006). This phase lasted on average eight to nine 
months, far longer than in standard reviews. This was not, however, a serious issue since there 
was no need to undertake reviews every twelve or eighteen months as for economic reviews 
(Schäfer, 2006). Third, the purpose of this phase was not an initial drafting of the main report 
but the establishment of a “background report”, which also aimed at a preliminary outline of 
thoughts for the subsequent phases of the review (OECD, 1966a).  
Major differences are to be found in the subsequent two phases. In the science reviews there 
are new important actors involved and a new role to the secretariat. While in the standard 
review the consultation phase consisted in two site visits by a team of OECD staff to discuss 
with national authorities at three months intervals from each other. In the first visit the survey 
of the country is prepared while the second is devoted to policy discussions with national 
authorities (Schäfer, 2006: 74). In science policy reviews, the consultation phase is prepared 
by the secretariat in cooperation with the country under review, but they are not the main 
protagonists in the mission. The secretariat followed the earlier recommendation of the ad- 
hoc group for the science policy (OECD, 1963a: 18) to mobilise a network of experts 
specialised on the specific problems raised by science. Thus, three or four external 
“examiners” take the leading role. They are ‘high calibre’ independent experts, selected by 
the secretariat, acting on their personal capacity (King, 2001: 344). A. King use the term 
examiners rather than the classical notion of peers used by OECD. In standard reviews, the 
peers that examine the country are representatives of other countries. For instance, in EDRC, 
the peers are the economic counsellors of the permanent national delegations that compose 
the Council (Woodward, 2009; Porter and Webb, 2008). The examiners and a member of the 
secretariat visit the country for bilateral contacts with the authorities and relevant ministers, 
senior officials and heads of research institutes, universities and industrialists. The duration of 
the visit varied with the degree of complexity of national research systems. The examiners 
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write their own report with their recommendations. These could not be changed by country 
representatives (King 2001: 344). The final phase of the review has been called by the 
Secretariat the “confrontation meeting”. This confrontation is between the authorities of the 
country under review and the examiners. It takes place under the auspices of the Committee 
for Scientific Research (renamed in 1966 into the Committee for Science Policy) in front of 
all committee members, populated by ‘peers’, science policy stakeholders from other 
countries (King, 2001). So, as in other reviews, the whole procedure revolves around peer 
discussion and peer pressure (Schäfer, 2006: 74). However, the examiners do not act as “well 
briefed inquisitors” as reported to be the case in the standard confrontation meeting 
(Wooldward, 2009: 58). The examiners are external to the Committee, and bring a new source 
of expertise reinforced by their moral authority. A. King described the reviews as a generating 
a friendly and constructive spirit of cooperation among the practitioners involved (King, 
2001: 344).  
In the standard review the final outcome is one unique consensual report that is re-written 
through the process (Jakobi and Martens, 2010). In science policy reviews the report is 
composed of three autonomous parts, corresponding to the three phases. The first part is the 
initial review made under the responsibility of the secretariat. It acts as a background report 
devoted to the analysis of the organisation of the national research system. The second part is 
the examiners’ report with their expert assessment of policy-making and operations of the 
system and their recommendations on the evolutions required. The third part contains the 
minutes of the confrontation meeting. The three together build one country review, published 
as part of the OECD series, “Reviews of National Science Policy”. 
Such a process, and in particular the involvement and visibility of external “examiners”, has 
no parallel in the OECD practices described earlier. One reason is no doubt the view of the 
Science policy as an exceptional area in OECD: “National governments have a considerable 
influence on the volume and balance of the national effort in scientific research and the 
degree to which scientific research contributes to economic growth and social welfare…the 
need for sound science policies at government level is therefore essential if research 
resources are to contribute to economic growth’ (OECD, 1964: 4). This led OECD to 
transform its traditional role as a generator of ideas and in the diffusion of best practices and 
models, into an active promoter of a new policy-making model. This is described in detail in 
the following section. 
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4. The OECD policy-making model: functions and 'implementation 
structures'  
OECD science policy reviews in the 1960s addressed the issue of how, with whom and in 
which format policy-making in science and technology policy should be implemented by 
national governments to favour knowledge production and exploitation linked to economic 
growth. This section presents the results of the extensive analysis of the reports produced, 
complemented by archive material from other OECD documents of the period, with the aim 
to reconstruct and make explicit the model for policy-making in science and technology 
policy designed by the OECD and its network. We use the term science and technology policy 
and science policy interchangeably. H. Brooks explained in the report “Science Growth and 
Society” (1971) that the use of science policy was a question of brevity, but that it includes all 
sciences and technologies. 
The existence of a model designed by the OECD for science policy-making was never 
assumed in the OECD public discourse. No explicit reference to a model can be found in any 
document. In the policy discourse the organisation refers to historical, administrative and 
cultural specificities of countries in shaping their own policy structures and operations. For 
instance, in the evaluation carried out of German and British research policies, the notion of 
an ideal model is rejected (OECD, 1967b: 22). Similarly, the studies on how S&T policies 
were developed in the 1960s rarely refer to the existence of a model. Elzinga and Jamison 
(1995), Salomon (1977) and Lundvall and Borras (2005) prefer to emphasise the role of 
historical events such as the launch of Sputnik and the beginning of the Cold War. It is only in 
1995, one decade after the model had been widely taken up, that a report by C. Freeman 
collected together best practices from leading countries mobilised by OECD through a 
process that reflects the traditional OECD role in other polices (see previous section).  
As a policy innovator, the OECD aimed to establish S&T public investment as a fully-fledged 
governmental policy, autonomous from other policies. Metaphorically, the OECD model 
provided a recipe for action, identifying the main ingredients, their order and how they should 
be put together in order to transfer science governance from the intermediary level of research 
councils and public institutes to the national governmental level.  
This model differs from the classical cycle of policy-making in public policies as 
conceptualised by political science scholars concerned with the flow of action. The policy 
cycle is a process that moves, in established policy areas, from problem selection and 
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inclusion in the agenda (agenda-setting), to a process of policy formation (design), adoption 
(decision-making), implementation (administration) and evaluation (Easton, 1965; Sabatier, 
1991). The OECD model for S&T is different. It is centred on the creation of structures, 
actors and functions that enable the policy cycle to deploy in the field. Therefore, following 
the seminal work of DiMaggio and Powel (1983), it focuses on the institutional setting 
required for agenda-setting and policy formulation. It does so by identifying the policy 
structures and functions to achieve the mission of an effective governmental level policy.  
Policy structures are the set of institutions, including norms and behaviours, and physical 
infrastructures invariant to choices and preferences of people or policy-makers (March and 
Olsen, 1984: 741). A specific component of policy structures are the “implementation 
structures” (Rip and Nederhof, 1986). These implementation structures are devoted to the 
organisation of action and the administration of programmes and other policy instruments. 
Our definition of function, on the other hand, is inspired by Durkheim’s theory of social 
function (1902) and T. Parsons (Parsons, 1959). The function in the model is the consistent 
set of behaviours and purposeful actions by actors to attain policy goals. Implementation 
structures are required to enact the functions for a well-working S&T policy-making system.  
As discussed in section 3, the OECD has never produced an explicit model or framework 
about the functions and structures for a national S&T policy. The choice was to implement it 
de facto through the country reviews and their recommendations on the policy structures to 
change or develop. The country reviews were considered as the central element in achieving 
the objective of having all OECD countries to develop national S&T policy. They were 
complemented by the discussions and debates that took place within the specific OECD 
science policy forum: the Committee for scientific research, renamed in 1966 as the 
Committee for science policy. We consider that the core debate on the adoption of a science 
policy was closed by the third Ministerial Meeting on Science, which took place in 1968 and 
which, for the first time, did not contain any topic related to the organisation of research 
systems or the evaluation of science policies (OECD, 1968b). 
Two reports were inspirational for the OECD model: the Bush Report (1945), and twenty 
years later the OECD report coordinated by Pierre Piganiol and produced while the OECD 
action was initiated (1963). Both reports present a rough proposal of science policy functions. 
The Bush report focused on governmental support to basic research and considered four of the 
functions that we shall discuss: advising, coordination, allocation of resources and 
administration (Bush, 1945: 20, 32-33). The Piganiol report (Piganiol et. al, 1963: 40-41) was 
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wider in scope, and identified most of the functions that should be implemented by a single 
coordinating body with a technical structure. 
To reveal the 'OECD model' for policy-making in science and technology, we have developed 
a comparative analysis of the science policy reviews, complemented by the analysis of the 
corpus of data retrieved from OECD Archives (in particular an analysis of the meetings of the 
Committee for Scientific Research, their preparatory documents, participants, and minutes 
during the 1960s). Country evaluations, and the discussions they raised, never covered the 
whole model. They considered only the aspects that were missing or needed change. This is 
why it is not possible to find the model as a whole in a given report. However, an examination 
of the set of 17 evaluations carried out during the 1960s and 1970s enables identification of 
all the dimensions of the model. The fact that many reports have issues in common enables 
better definition of the functions as well as the variety of relevant implementation structures 
to be made explicit.  
Seven main functions have been identified: horizontal coordination and advice, planning and 
budgeting, priority-setting and resources allocation, and administration. The functions are set 
out in these four groups, because of their interrelatedness (i.e. the two functions are 
interdependent; the outcomes of one integrates the actions of the other). Only administration 
is singled out by its horizontal support role. In the model the functions cannot be separated 
from the implementation structures. Whenever a function is described, the implementing body 
is simultaneously described in detail, including its composition and mode of operation. 
This section examines the different functions and their corresponding implementation 
structures in turn. For each function, we have selected citations from at least two reports to 
give the reader a more precise view of how these were tailored to the corresponding country 
and its history and path. Citations come also from other OECD documents when they have 
proposed generalisations about a given function and its operationalization. 
4.1. Coordination and advice 
Horizontal coordination and advice reflect control by national governments of the allocation 
of the total resources devoted to research, independent of its civilian or nuclear or military 
nature, and sets the direction for growth. This function presupposes advice from researchers 
and industrialists in setting rationales, strategies and priorities for the formulation of the 
national policy. The function undertakes the transformation of previous vertical coordination 
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into horizontal coordination at Government level, namely the policy coordination of sectoral 
ministries with scientific infrastructures.  
Two quotes from the examiners to the French (OECD, 1966c: 14) and American (OECD, 
1968c: 7) science policies illustrate the importance of a centralised coordination: ‘(…) modern 
governments therefore find themselves compelled to take reasoned decisions about the 
priorities of national interests; they are induced to formulate a science policy which is not an 
end in itself, but also an instrument at the service of the country's traditional interests in 
foreign affairs, defence, internal economy and social welfare’. ‘In short, while there is no 
preconceived policy, no science policy at the outset, one comes into being through the effect 
of the conscious pursuit of national goals - a science policy is convergence. It seems … that 
the countries of Europe are nearer than the United States to a science policy in the primary 
sense of the term’.  
The central pillar of this model is the creation at Government level of a central authority 
responsible for central coordination and decision-making of S&T policy. The implementation 
structure for coordination should be a member of Government with responsibilities on the 
coordination of funds and policy options to ensure a high level political coordination and to 
enforce decisions. Several solutions were considered: Prime minister, inter-ministerial 
commission, and minister for science. This body should have the executive decision on 
scientific planning, priority setting and budgeting.  
Examples of bipolar coordination between Parliament and Governments were identified as 
well as best practice (OECD, 1967b: 142; OECD, 1968c: 478-479 (French version). But the 
main requirement for parliaments is the monitoring of the policy design and implementation, 
as mentioned in the Irish review (OECD, 1974: 83): ‘Finally we wish to raise the problem of 
parliamentary involvement in policy for science and technology. This might be solved by the 
creation of a Parliamentary Committee for Science and Technology on the model of those 
which exist in many countries.’ 
Horizontal coordination by research councils is not considered in the model. A quote from the 
Italian evaluators report stresses the importance of transferring the coordination of science 
from the research council to the government (OECD, 1969a: 138-139): ‘It is therefore 
essential to create at government level a body responsible for determining the country's 
science policy (…) Transposed into the Italian context, this means that the programming of 
science policy and the co-ordination of all decisions should be in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, who is alone capable of acting as the necessary arbiter between ministerial 
14 
departments, and would act through a Delegate, who might be a Deputy Prime Minister or a 
Minister without portfolio’. A similar recommendation was made to the Spanish government 
(OECD, 1971b: 99): ‘An inter-ministerial body, with effective responsibility for formulating 
and implementing scientific and technological policy at the top level must be found inside the 
machinery of the government’. The recommendation for the Australian government follows 
the same lines some years later (OECD, 1977:190): ‘In the view of the broad significance of 
the national scientific effort which impinges on the work of nearly all government 
departments, we think there is a need for a central mechanism (….). One approach, which has 
worked well in a number of countries, is to create a committee of those Ministries whose 
departments have major scientific activities responsibilities, directly under the Prime Minister 
(…). In most cases where such a body is formed, the Prime Minister, who is the titular 
chairman of the Ministerial Science Committee, designates a Minister of state to be the 
regular chairman. This may be the Minister for Science rather than Minister of Science (…). 
The idea behind this is that the Science Minister, not having operational responsibility for 
what must inevitably be but a fraction of the total scientific efforts of the country, is in a 
position to balance, coordinate and criticize with complete impartiality with regard to the 
total effort’.  
Central authority at ministerial level for policy coordination is an evolution of the approach 
proposed in the Piganiol report. The report did not advocate a minister for science policy, but 
a national science office that would provide evidence and advice to the policy-making 
process. This office would be the focal point for the three identified functions: formulation of 
a national policy for science, coordination of scientific activities and integration of science 
policy in general policy (Piganiol et.al., 1963: 34-35). The reasoning behind the model 
proposed by the report preferred evolution to rupture in the new institutional machinery for 
science policy: ‘what is here envisaged is not a science ministry or an executive science 
agency. Science like economics affects all areas of national life and national policy... The 
progress and freedom of science, moreover, have been best served historically in a pluralistic 
situation, and can suffer when co-ordination becomes control’ (Piganiol et.al., 1963: 35). 
Policy coordination at government level is a major shift to the then prevailing multiple 
vertical public interventions of national laboratories and research councils. This multiple 
coordination was dominant in OECD member countries by 1963. According to the OECD 
country reports (OECD, 1963b), only four of the fourteen countries analysed (Belgium, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom) had a recently appointed central authority at 
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governmental level responsible for S&T policy. Dispersed coordination also existed in the 
United States with coordination divided between the President, Congress and agencies. There 
were also cases of mere formal assignment of scientific affairs to prime ministers as in Spain 
and Portugal. In fact, members of governments with a science portfolio existed only 
sporadically before the 1960s. In general these experiments were ephemeral due to lack of 
policy instruments and authority. For example, France was one of the first countries to 
appoint a secretary of state for scientific research. Henri Longchambon, part of the 
government of Pierre Mendès-France, lasted in office for eight months in 1953-1954. 
The crucial role of the authority in charge of formulation and implementation of S&T policy 
is that of the ‘arbiter’, Negotiating the selection of national priorities and objectives and 
steering the direction of scientific efforts (OECD, 1969a: 159; OECD, 1968c: 482; OECD, 
1969b: 407; OECD, 1971b: 99-100). The main task is thus to coordinate the level of resources 
allocated to national scientific and technological development with the other ministers 
responsible for scientific infrastructures, and subsequently with the minister of finance.  
In the OECD model, the formulation of S&T policies is built on centralised scientific advice 
to the coordinating authority, to ensure credibility and legitimacy. According to the reviews 
and minutes of the meetings, advice is the least controversial function during the definition 
and adoption of the model. It follows the trajectory of scientific advice on policy issues 
provided by academies of science and domain-based committees of research councils, but 
with some additional innovative features. First, it is centralised in a body tasked to advise 
government in setting priorities and choosing strategies for national policy. Secondly, it is not 
exclusively composed of scientists. 
The selection of members of the advisory body is based on prestige and the ability to 
influence processes and strategies. The advisory body should be composed of recognised 
scientists from various disciplines - natural sciences and behavioural science, engineering and 
economics – and of key representatives from industry, trade unions and civil society. Advisers 
should, preferably, be nominated as individuals, and not as ex-officio members of their 
respective organisations (OECD, 1963b, OECD, 1967a, OECD, 1973, OECD, 1968c, OECD, 
1971c, OECD, 1969b). 
The importance of a centralised advice to national policy is illustrated in the review of the 
Japanese policy (OECD, 1967a: 21): ‘Presently, the Council for Science and Technology is 
over concerned with the interests of the Government while the Science Council of Japan tends 
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exclusively to represent the interests of the scientific community. The most overriding need is 
a policy for science and scientific affairs that is truly national in its concept and scope’.  
Similar advisory structures to the one proposed by the OECD were already in place in certain 
member countries (OECD, 1963b). Belgium, France, Spain and Sweden already had national 
advisory councils for science. The United Kingdom had created two councils, one for 
scientific issues and the other for technology. In the United States, the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC) was responsible for advising the President. Germany in contrast 
had advisory councils dispersed among multiple settings. 
Two implementation structures for advice were considered: a committee or an individual. In 
most cases, the committee was named the science policy council or advisory council, while 
the individual holds the title of scientific advisor to the president or prime minister. The 
activities of the advisory body should be supported by a high-level technical secretariat which 
will be examined in detail at the end of this section: this secretariat should provide technical 
and analytical support for the evaluation of the national research system, applying quantitative 
approaches based on input and output research indicators. It should also support the 
generation of consensus in society around the importance of science. The reports produced 
should support different stages of the policy-making process, in particular national planning 
and budgeting phases (Piganiol et. al., 1963). 
The advisory function was given particular attention in the reviews. The recommendations for 
implementing the function were very detailed (e.g. the reviews of Italian, Canadian, and 
Austrian science policies). The following recommendation of examiners in the Italian case 
(OECD, 1969a: 139) illustrate well the level of detail: ‘The latter should be assisted in his 
task by a Science Policy Council, that he should chair, (…) its members, few in number, 
should be drawn from academic circles (University and University-type research), industry 
and public life. It should meet frequently and, while advising on science budgets and on 
guidelines for the national programmes, it should not be concerned with the distribution of 
funds. This council should be assisted in its work by an adequate secretariat (compiling 
information, statistics and inventories, studies, etc.). It should be headed by a Secretary-
General who would help the Minister responsible for Scientific and Technical Research in 
preparing decisions for approval of the Committee of Ministers on Scientific and Technical 
Research, and of which he would himself be a member." Similar detail can be found in the 
recommendation to the Australian authorities  (OECD, 1977: 191-193): ‘On all matters of 
detail and substance the Ministerial Committee would be assisted by an Advisory Council for 
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Scientific and Technology Policy, which would prepare the work of the Ministers and work 
out the details of the national science policy in consultation with appropriate experts (…).  
The advisory council would report to the Prime Minister through the Minister of Science. If 
possible the chairman must be appointed on a full-time basis. He should be a scientist of 
international reputation known to have a broad appreciation of the economic and social 
consequences of scientific development (... the council) should be small, we would suggest 12-
15 members, who would be chosen in their personal capacities and not as representatives of 
organizations (…). Thus, in addition to natural scientists, there should be economists and 
behavioural scientists, industrialists (not just directors of industrial research) and at least one 
trade unionist". 
4.2. Planning and budgeting 
The planning function aims to align the objective of the national research system with the 
long-term national economic objectives and to articulate how science contributes to their 
achievement (OECD, 1962: 5). It aims to produce comprehensive programming of national 
effort in order to simultaneously respond to the needs of knowledge production and its 
application to societal needs (OECD, 1962: 5-7, 1968a: 105). With active participation of 
members of government in the formulation of plans, it aims to achieve coherence in the 
objectives across several policy domains and a better integration of research priorities 
(OECD, 1969a).  
OECD preferred flexible approaches to planning in science over deterministic approaches. 
National plans were encouraged to favour bottom-up initiatives on scientific matters (OECD, 
1968a: 105). The time span of S&T plans was not pre-determined, but there was a preference 
for medium to long-term perspective (OECD, 1969a). A flexible approach and long term 
vision were important requisites to gain the support of scientific communities keen on their 
scientific freedom.  
The importance of the link between plans for national economic development and for science 
is evident in the Australian review (OECD, 1977: 189): ‘In Australia, as elsewhere, it is 
necessary to relate research and development programs as realistically as possible to 
national objectives. This is particularly difficult to do in the absence in the country of any 
indicative planning mechanism’.  
Planning was an important function in the model until the late 1970s as, in most OECD 
countries, national policy options and resources were organised in national medium term 
18 
plans for economic and social development. In fact, by 1963 (OECD, 1963b) five countries 
already had national plans for S&T: Belgium, France, Italy, Norway and Spain.  
Planning is implemented by the technical secretary or body associated with administration of 
science policy, supporting governmental coordination. Overall responsibility should rest with 
central programming or planning bodies, in order to favour integration of science programmes 
into the overall national planning processes (OECD, 1966c).  
During the 1970s, national plans lost their importance in governmental policy-making 
processes, and in some cases disappeared. As an alternative to long-term planning, leading 
countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, implemented forecasting exercises for 
research policy (OECD, 1981). In line with these changing circumstances, OECD proposed 
the conduct of foresight exercises to keep a medium to long-term framework in public 
investment parallel to medium-term plans. The creation of specialised centres in technology 
forecasting for technical and social change was therefore recommended, as instances in the 
Spanish review of research policy (OECD, 1971b: 80-81): ‘Lastly, there is another type of 
specifically scientific and technological information which belongs in the field of 
technological forecasting. We know today that, whilst no research programme associated 
with economic growth can be prepared without a clear idea of the various stages of such 
growth, no serious attempt can be made to define the latter without first scanning the future of 
technology and including in the projections and plans all possible data on coming 
technological upheavals (...) Nevertheless, we believe that no country today can develop 
without a centre for the study and dissemination of these methods (monitoring signs of 
technological change, Delphi techniques, relevance trees and systems analysis), explain their 
merits and weaknesses and make allowance, in their utilization, of essential national 
characteristics’. 
Planning and budgeting are interlinked functions. The science budget is defined as the annual 
instalment of the medium term plan (OECD, 1966b: 33). The national research budget is 
necessary to have a national S&T policy (OECD, 1966b: 33). The science budget is the 
aggregation of the earmarked budgets of ministries for direct and indirect funding and 
execution, annually inscribed in the national budget. It mirrors both the government 
expenditures on research and the policy choices on resource allocations to realise national 
objectives. For the science budget to be an effective policy tool, it should cover the research 
appropriations in their entirety: to funding agencies and public research performers, and 
including nuclear and defence research (OECD, 1967a; OECD, 1966c).  
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The science budget is a fundamental mechanism in the model for two reasons: first, because 
of its role as a promoter of change in the administrative procedures related to national 
budgets; and second due to the increased visibility it affords scientific issues in the national 
political agenda (OECD, 1966b: 31). The annual discussion of the science budget, integrated 
with the annual national budget cycle, fosters public discussion on science strategies, 
facilitates coordination among political bodies, specifically between Government and 
Parliament (OECD, 1973). In 1963, only two member countries had a science budget, France 
and Belgium (OECD, 1963b). Eight years later, H. Brooks (1971: 40) measured the change 
that had taken place: “Here one can recall the two main recommendations of the Piganiol 
report as a measure of distance travelled since that report was written. The first was that 
each country should set up a central mechanism for reviewing the total national effort in 
science and technology, its growth and relevance as well as its influence on, a wide spectrum 
of other national policies”. 
The reviews paid great attention to budgeting. They were critical to those countries without 
science budgets or basing them on the ex post calculation of the budgets of public 
organisations. The sum of appropriations was referred to as an arithmetic process that could 
not be equated to a policy function, which articulates planning, priority setting and monitoring 
exercises (OECD, 1968c: 482; OECD, 1974: 83). A similar criticism could be found when 
budgets did not include nuclear and military research (OECD, 1966c: 118). Australian policy 
review illustrates its relevance for the overall functioning of the model (OECD, 1977: 154): 
“The decisive part played by government finance shows that the Australian Government 
would benefit from having an ‘annual science budget’. Realizing how important is the 
influence of R&D expenditure on the whole pattern of government expenditure, several 
OECD countries are now drawing up such a budget every year by making a functional 
reclassification of the items in the budgets of the various ministries which are for financing 
scientific activities”.  
The scope and organisation of science budgets and the depth of discussions in national 
parliaments differed across the OECD membership. Science budget and the discussion and 
decision processes have taken different formats depending upon the national institutional 
setting, such as a science vote, block vote, or a discriminated vote programme by programme. 
In the case of the French review, examiners were critical of the parts of investment not 
included in the budget (OECD, 1966c: 94): “As stated in part I of the report, an appreciable 
proportion of research (military research, nuclear research, space research and research by 
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CNET) is not included in the 'research block vote'. This creates the danger that certain 
research will be neglected or that on the other hand resources will be wasted in unnecessary 
duplication, it therefore seems necessary to coordinate action taken outside the block vote 
with that taken within”. Similarly, examiners recommended the Japanese authorities to adopt 
an encompassing science budget to allow coordination (OECD, 1967a: 23): “The aspect of 
the R&D budget most disconcerting to the observer is its division into more or less isolated 
compartments, one for university and one for all other research. This constitutes a major 
obstacle to the development of a coherent science policy”. 
4.3. Priority-setting and allocation of resources 
The priority-setting function is related to the choices that need to be made by governments 
among fields of sciences and policy options (OECD, 1967b: 28). It determines the targets for 
the concentration of S&T resources in order to achieve long-term identified economic 
national goals (OECD, 1969b: 384; OECD, 1971a: 247; OECD, 1971b: 80).  
Setting the direction of public investment in research by choosing strategic priorities is the 
main feature of the function. OECD considered the definition of strategic priorities as an 
invaluable asset for scientists to have long-term funding frameworks, provided that they were 
coordinated with the promotion of industrial investment for an exploitation of the benefits of 
research. This recommendation to the Spanish authorities echoes well the definition of the 
function (OECD, 1971b: 80-81): “It should not be forgotten however that it is not enough to 
determine the main lines of research. Steps must also be taken to establish the industrial 
structure which can carry research results to the production and commercialization stage”.  
Priorities are to be defined at Government level to have an impact on direct funding and for 
its translation in national programmes. Implementation structures for priority-setting differed 
depending upon the national setting. In the Irish review the recommendation was for the 
technical body to undertake priority-setting (OECD, 1974: 81): “The functions and 
responsibility of the National Board would be the formulation of a national science policy 
(…) It would seek to identify priority areas for such activities (S&T activities in the sector)”. 
While in the Australian review, the recommendation targeted the ministerial committee 
(OECD, 1977: 191): “The Ministerial Committee for Science would have the duty to 
formulate governmental objectives in terms which could asset them in giving guidance as to 
broad priorities of research and development effort”.  
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Priority-setting was controversial in the 1960s. In 1963 few countries explicitly assigned 
priorities to research funds. Only Belgium, Germany and the United States referred to the 
existence of priorities assigned to strategic research. In Belgium, the process was based on 
expert assessment given to the National Council for S&T. In Germany, the responsibility to 
identify the areas for priority investment was assigned to the German research council (DFG), 
while the Advisory Council would produce an annual priority report. In the United States, 
three bodies were responsible for the identification, coordination, and selection of priorities, 
the Federal Council for S&T, the Office of the President and the National Academy of 
Sciences (OECD, 1963b). However some countries were not in favour of government 
involvement in priority-setting. The Netherlands, for example, was a strong advocate that 
priorities should be the sole responsibility of scientists (OECD, 1963b). Even in 1971, Swiss 
authorities questioned the recommendation to set priorities in the confrontation meeting of the 
Swiss review (OECD, 1971a: 247).  
In the model, the allocation of resources is the instrument to accomplish the national 
objectives and priorities established through the planning, priority-setting and budgeting 
phases. The allocation of resources is the process of deployment and use of the scientific 
potential (people, money, and institutions) of a country for specific aims (OECD, 1966c: 33). 
It is divided in two components based on the nature of research in consideration: 
fundamental4 research and applied research (OECD, 1962, 1963a). For the Committee for 
Scientific Research, contrary to applied research, an economic rationale should not be 
included in the allocation of resources to fundamental research, which should not been seen as 
a constraint to the traditional freedom of researchers. The Irish review states the broader 
scope of allocation of resources determined by the policy (OECD, 1974: 81): “Science policy 
is policy for the development of technology, as well as science. It must cover the allocation of 
resources for the whole spectrum of scientific research and technological development”.  
The ways in which funding was allocated at the beginning of the 1960s differed widely 
between the United States and Europe. According to the country reports (OECD, 1963b), in 
Europe the funds were mainly allocated through direct funding to the research institutions and 
fellowships to researchers. The research funds had multiple sources, including research 
councils, private foundations, business and ministries, as in Belgium, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Spain, and Portugal. Only the United States had developed project-based 
                                                
4 In general OECD used the term fundamental research. Basic research, a term coined by V. Bush, was more in use in the 
American context. Both terms have equal meaning, dealing with the search for new knowledge regardless of its application.  
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competitive funding at the Federal level, particularly via the National Science Foundation 
(OECD, 1968a: 119). This may explain why competitive funding allocated to projects was 
prominent in most of the reviews. Competitive funding is organised in national programmes 
to address specific objectives and targets. The programmes have a dedicated budget 
distributed through competitive processes in order to select the best research project 
proposals, with a medium-term frame (OECD, 1967a: 25). They are a complement to the 
block grant funding directly distributed to organisations based on disciplinary boundaries and 
past spending patterns. Projects should be evaluated according to their merits and potential 
impact to national needs (OECD, 1968a: 119). 
The implementation structure associated with the allocation of resources is a body without 
research laboratories and covering a wide range of fields and types of research (OECD, 
1969b: 448; OECD, 1969a: 142). This led the role of research councils to be questioned, as 
the main funders of fundamental research at the time. Research councils were not seen as 
suitable to be responsible for the whole function as is illustrated by Italian review (OECD, 
1969a: 139): “These diverse functions are at present discharged with more or less intensity by 
the CNR. Very well equipped for its function of supporting fundamental research, the CNR is 
less well equipped to deal with questions of applied research”. A similar criticism was also 
found in the Japanese review (OECD, 1967a: 22): “The Science and Technology Agency, with 
the responsibility for over all budgetary coordination, support of inter-departmental research 
programmes and administration of laboratories, under its own control, performs extremely 
diversified tasks. This situation is complicated by the fact that the same agency acts as 
secretariat to the Council of Science and Technology as well as to the four specialized 
advisory councils, and therefore is sometimes in the position of acting and judging as both 
judge and advocate”. 
4.5 Administration  
The OECD model proposes a new public body devoted to the administration of research 
policies and management of national programmes. Previously, both the Bush and Piganiol 
reports had proposed the creation of an independent agency, called the national science office. 
However their views differed. While Bush proposed the agency to focus on supporting basic 
research, Piganiol supported the idea of an agency that would be responsible for the funding 
of national programmes and that would also be in charge of science policy administration and 
support. However both agreed on the fact that the agency should not perform research or have 
any operational managerial responsibilities (Bush, 1945: 32-33, Piganiol et. al, 1963: 35-39).  
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In the OECD model, the administration function is horizontal providing support to the entire 
policy-making process. It acts as the focal point for priority-setting, planning and budgeting, 
coordinating them with central planning offices, Treasury and governmental authorities. The 
main centralised activities are analytical support to advisory and coordinating bodies and the 
measurement and evaluation of research system (OECD, 1969b; OECD, 1971b; OECD, 
1974). The scope of the agency is national covering the whole national spectrum of activities 
in S&T, without any specific focus on academia or fundamental research (OECD, 1971c: 
249). 
The national scope and the role in policymaking processes of the agency is highlighted in the 
Canadian review report (OECD, 1969b: 407): “A Central science secretariat is essential if the 
Science Minister is to be well informed concerning all the issues and proposals with which he 
would have to deal. Such a secretariat would have to analyse and evaluate all the proposals 
put to the Minister, would be responsible for ensuring that the necessary statistics of research 
and development expenditure and of the pool of scientific and technical manpower are 
available… (It) would undertake special studies of scientific fields and problems for the 
Minister”. In the Irish report, a new body was proposed with detailed description of its role 
(OECD, 1974: 79): “In essence our recommendations for the present are the following. We 
propose that the new statutory body be charged with preparing, under the responsibility of 
the Minister of Science, centralized policy proposals (including a detailed overall science 
budget) for decision at government level within the proposed Committee of the Cabinet for 
Science and Technology, but the departments should continue to finance and to supervise and 
control the institutes set up under their aegis”.  
The implementation is through a specialised agency without laboratories, responsible for the 
administration of the policy-making cycle (OECD, 1969b: 423). The agency should report to 
the Prime Minister to ensure effective inter-ministerial coordination. It should be composed of 
professional staff, preferably a combination of professionals who are either senior civil 
servants or researchers trained to implement plans and to prepare decision-making processes 
at political level (Piganiol et. al., 1963).  
Two agencies already in existence served as models for the new body: the French Délégation 
Générale de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique (DGRST) and the Japanese Science and 
Technology Agency (STA). Both were independent bodies with good reputations among 
actors, and both endowed with large budgets to launch and manage national programmes. 
Contrary to expectations, NSF was never suggested as a model, because of its focus on 
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universities and basic research and of its lack of direct involvement in policy-making. The 
identification of DGRST as a role model is evident in the Belgium review (OECD, 1966b: 
110): “Given that the formulation of science policy has been coordinated at Government level 
(...) would it not be appropriate to co-ordinate its administration and supervision in the same 
way? This, of course, would mean creating not a conventional government department, but a 
streamlined all purpose agency along the lines of the French Commissariat Général du plan 
or Délégation Générale à la Recherche Scientifique et Technique”.  
Research councils and ministerial departments were not favoured to administer S&T policy 
for two reasons. The first is the inability of traditional vertical organisations to cope with the 
management of horizontal coordination (OECD, 1969b). The second reason is more 
pragmatic: the workload of research councils with the operational management of their 
research laboratories (OECD, 1966b; OECD, 1966c; OECD, 1969a; OECD, 1969b). The 
following two quotes illustrate these points. The first one explains the reasons why the 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR) should not be the responsible organisation for the 
administration of the policy in Italy (OECD, 1969a: 139): “In the case of science policy 
proper, the multitude of tasks falling to the CNR and the commitments which they involve, 
make it difficult in practice for the CNR to adopt the position of arbiter which is essential to 
the success”. The second quote proposes a new name for the body in charge of the 
administration to distinguish further from the research council (OECD, 1974: 80): “In order 
to break with the present status of the NSC to be named quite clear, the new statutory body 
should receive a new name. As a suggestion we present the following possibility: The 
National Board for Science and Technology”.  
5. The diffusion of the model in OECD countries 
In this section we consider the diffusion of the model in OECD member countries. Our initial 
work focused on the analysis of institutional changes country by country. The length of the 
argument and the very similar conclusions arrived at country after country drove us to adopt 
another approach. We have therefore chosen to focus our attention on the adoption of the 
different functions. This was all the more logical, given that a number of targeted comparative 
reviews have been conducted by OECD services on these different functions. Our review 
demonstrates how widely these functions have become embedded in national policies.  
In the model, the existence of a central authority with coordination power at national 
government level is crucial. When the OECD action begun in the early 1960s only Belgium, 
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Germany, the Netherlands, UK, Japan and France had appointed ministers with science 
portfolios (OECD, 1963b, Jang, 2000). Less than one decade later, the majority of the OECD 
countries had appointed ministers responsible for science. A. King, the first head of the 
OECD scientific affairs directorate, in his later review of EEEC-OECD scientific activities 
(King, 2001) recalls the difficulties in organising the first meeting of science ministers in 
1963, since the majority of countries did not have a minister in charge of scientific affairs. 
Three years later, by the second meeting, this issue had been fully addressed: “there was an 
important difference: nearly every country was represented by a minister of science” (ibid: 
343). In the earlier stages of implementation of research policy, Prime Ministers or Presidents 
have often played central roles in coordinating the research efforts, e.g. Japan (OECD, 1967a) 
or Belgium (OECD, 1966b), the Prime Minister of Belgium being the first chairman of the 
OECD Ministerial Committee. Over time, they became progressively less involved, and the 
responsibility for science issues was transferred to ministers in charge of research. There is 
however one notable exception to this movement: the USA never created a central federal 
authority for research. State agencies were able to keep their autonomous and distributed 
power.  
Following the OECD model, plans for S&T should define the choices and strategies of 
national Governments for the medium to the longer term. As such, this function was linked 
with the post second world war period when planning was a key tool for government activity. 
It was one of the earliest functions to be implemented. Bodies for planning S&T issues 
existed since the 1950s pioneered by France, Norway, Switzerland and Italy and diffused in 
the 1960s to other OECD countries (Benum, 2007; OECD, 1966c; OECD, 1969a; OECD, 
1970; OECD, 1971a). S&T planning has decreased in importance along with national 
planning. In general, this has been replaced by foresight exercises coupled with medium-term 
programmes for science. Budgeting and priority setting were often associated with planning 
exercises, yet they could be developed autonomously depending upon the approach of the 
country. OECD highlighted the importance of having a research budget because of the 
measurement of public investment devoted to R&D. In 1958 France became the first country 
to have a research budget, and to implement a research block vote (OECD, 1966c). Two 
decades later research budgets were a reality in most of the OECD member states (OECD, 
1981).  
Priority-setting remains important in most countries. Although an exception in the OECD 
model, as no prescriptive format or way of implementation was proposed. Only late in 1991, 
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did the OECD produce a report on the issue acknowledging the variety of approaches taken 
by countries and concluding that priority-setting was the “corner-stone of the S&T policy” 
(OECD, 1991: 28). Priority-setting has remained untouched in the past 40 years and keeps its 
relevance (Feller and Cozzens, 2007). De facto formal advisory councils have in most OECD 
countries played important roles in priority-setting and in providing advice on national 
programmes (Braun, 1998; Rip and Nederhof, 1986). There is quite some variety in their 
composition, some being composed only by scientists, and others with a range of societal 
actors. The advisory function has followed the same path as for political responsibility, 
moving from the level of Presidents or Prime Ministers to level of ministers responsible for 
science. This was also the case for the American PSAC that has seen its role and proximity to 
the President decreasing over time (Smith, 1990). 
The last two functions - allocation of resources and professional administration – have 
become the most influential functions in S&T policymaking. All countries have national 
programmes, either of a structural nature or based on thematic priorities. Most now have 
institutionalised project-based competitive funding modes based on peer-review. Project 
funding was taken into the model by copying the North American experience of the NSF (see 
Smith, 1990). Martin and Irvine (1992) already noted a progressive decline of block funding 
in most OECD countries. Lepori and colleagues (2007) demonstrate that for a number of EU 
countries, including countries that were known to rely mostly on block funding such as 
France, competitive funding has steadily increased as a proportion of overall funding over the 
last 30 years.  
Finally, the OECD model advocates the creation of a professional body to administer research 
policy and manage funds targeting national priorities, independent from the research councils. 
Although not all countries adopted the same organisational format, the professionalisation of 
the administration in charge of research policymaking is a reality in all countries. Three types 
of organisations co-exist for project-based funding: ministries with departments responsible 
for the management of national programmes and corresponding funding allocation; research 
councils which have evolved towards the profile prescribed by OECD with research institutes 
integrated in the university system, and agencies created in general de novo.  
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6. Factors underlying the rapid diffusion of the OECD model of science 
policy making 
This review of the diffusion of the model shows that most, if not all, OECD countries have 
developed an institutional framework and policy structures that fulfil the main functions 
identified by the model. At the same time it shows a wide variety in the policy structures 
adopted. In this final section we highlight five factors that, in our views, explain the quick and 
enduring diffusion of this model of science (and now innovation) policy-making.  
6.1- A coherent and pragmatic model  
The model proposed is pragmatic, it does not define a specific policy process, rather it focuses 
on the policy structures that enable the Government to elaborate and implement a national 
S&T policy. As such the model embeds a limited number of principles, which need to be 
shared for a country to move towards such an objective.  
First and foremost is the recognition of the pervasiveness of science and technology. 
Pervasiveness has two faces: one was already practiced in a number of countries where the 
different sectoral policies had progressively established research services and/or 
establishments (with often the exception of education ministries). The other lies in the 
transverse dimensions of S&T that seldom remain specific to a sector and may lead a country 
to waste a significant share of its public resources by not coordinating efforts and not reaping 
the potential for synergies. Furthermore, most countries do not have the means to engage in 
all directions and thus risk making sub-critical investments in many dimensions. A. King, the 
first head of the OECD directorate, underlines strongly this point in his later review of EEEC-
OECD scientific activities (King, 2001, p. 343). This principle drives to put on the forefront 
the issue of high-level transversal coordination.  
This first principle is immediately connected to a second one, the distinction between two 
‘classical’ aspects in policymaking: allocation and implementation. Defining the different 
allocations at Government level does not mean having only one administration in charge of 
formulation and implementation. In this respect, the model is clearly different from classical 
policy models. It recognises that relevant implementation may require different 
implementation structures, closer to, in some cases, vertical departments, or, for fundamental 
science, further away from ‘top-down’ decision making, via research councils or agencies. 
This left the panel members with significant room for manoeuvre in order to take into account 
past trajectories as well as present national policy preferences.  
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The third principle lies in the fact that a policy exists only if it has the classical ingredients of 
a department or ministry: a budget, a priority-setting process and an administration to prepare 
and organise action. These attributes were considered in all reports as critical, and gave rise as 
we have seen to numerous recommendations. This was all the more easy, as by separating 
decisions on overall allocations from implementation activities, no major reshuffling of 
previous governmental operating structures were needed. In most cases, it was ‘simply’ 
adding a coordinating layer with limited staff but bearing the high status of being associated 
with the Prime Minister (at least in the initial phase).  
The last principle was heavily underlined in the Piganiol report: investments in science being 
long-term, they require both the agreement and support from the parties involved, what we 
now label stakeholders. The more ‘drastic’ are the choices to be made, the more important the 
consultation and preparation phases. The response at the time was to develop an “advisory 
committee for science policy”, as was named the body created in the UK as early as 1947. As 
we have seen following national practices, recommendations have differed from country to 
country while keeping this central principle of openness and discussion to prepare for choices 
to be made. 
These four principles or features can be seen to constitute a backbone of institutionalisation 
that is independent of the policy problems at hand, once science (and now innovation) is 
recognised as a key dimension to care for a country. Jean Guinet5 who joined the OECD 
evaluation team in the 1970s before heading it for nearly two decades, prefers to speak of 
“basic principles that act as a floating anchor”. For him “they cannot be openly stated; they 
are embedded in the approach … that diffuses the model in a specific situation”. What is then 
critical are both the process adopted for “insuring a good balance between the specific context 
and the national trajectory on one side and the basic principles on the other to arrive to a 
positive sum game”, and the time at which the evaluations are done. 
6.2. Nobody escaped the evaluation process 
The principle of undertaking country reviews was adopted as soon as the OECD was created. 
This gave rise to a first set of ‘country reports’ on individual countries and of a synthesis by 
OECD (1963b) by the time of the first ministerial conference. These were replicating the 
already well-established OEEC-OECD practice that had already acquired a high reputation of 
annual examinations of the economic situation of members. As we have mentioned (section 
                                                
5 Interview, 29 September 2011 
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3), this process, mainly conducted internally by OECD staff, was not considered sufficient to 
deal with science policies. These reviews were transformed into a background analytical 
review and complemented by a group of examiners that lead the country visits, the design of 
recommendations and the discussion in the confrontation meeting. The review process lasted 
on average more than one year because of the limited availability of high-level experts, and 
OECD staff was not large enough to handle more than a few reviews per year. Still by 1974, 
16 ‘reviews of national science policy’ had been published covering 17 countries (table 1).  
Table 1 Reviews of national science policy  
1964 Sweden 1970 Norway 1977 Australia 
1965 Greece 1971 Spain 1986 Portugal 
1966 Belgium 1971 Switzerland 1987 Finland 
1966 France 1971 Austria 1988 Denmark 
1967 Japan 1972 Iceland 2007 Luxemburg 
1967 UK 1973 The Netherlands 2007 New Zealand 
1967 Germany 1974 Ireland   
1968 USA     
1969 Italy     
1969 Canada     
Note: Table 1 lists the first reviews of the 20 OECD members that signed the initial treaty plus the 4 new members that 
joined in the 1960s (Japan and Finland) and 1970s (Australia and New Zealand). 
The list is instructive, as well as the sequence. During the 1960s, the US, the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan asked for national reviews as did Sweden, Belgium and 
Greece. Within the next four years Norway, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands, 
Iceland and Ireland followed. Portugal followed in the 1980s as well as the two other Nordic 
countries, Finland and Denmark, which had hitherto shown only limited interest in S&T 
policy. It is worth noting that Finland will be the first country to adopt the revised approach of 
‘national system of innovation’ proposed by OECD at the turn of the 1990s. Immediately 
after joining in 1971, Australia requested a review (publication in 1977). New Zealand and 
Luxembourg waited until the rebirth of the national reviews in the 2000s (2007 in both cases). 
The exposure of countries to ‘recommendations’ and ‘public discussions’ concerning their 
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policy setting thus corresponded in most cases to the effective consolidation at Government 
level of a national science policy. 
6.3. The central role of experts in promoting the model  
As already noted a number of times, we use the term evaluation (in contrast to OECD 
documents that never use it) to highlight the very strong difference between the process 
adopted for science policy and the other OECD reviewing processes. In all recent studies of 
the OECD (see section 3), this specific process is never mentioned as such: it was mobilised 
during only a ‘short period’ of time (just over one decade) and then was stopped and 
forgotten. The new generation of reviews of innovation policies that started from 2000 
onwards, and has resulted in a long list of requests from member countries, has gone back to 
using the dominant format: with the secretariat conducting the review entirely responsible, 
using consultants when needed, and putting forwards its recommendations. Michael Keenan6, 
from the OECD team in charge of these reviews, considers that the present approach reflects 
the changing knowledge base of research and innovation policies, and that, contrary to the 
situation prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s, the accumulated academic knowledge has now 
become a major source on which to rely, as evidenced by the average 100 academic citations 
contained in the present reports.  
This can explain why the OECD secretariat considered that a “modification of the practice” 
was needed. The central feature lay in the “appointment of two to three independent 
examiners of high calibre, none of whom came from the country under examination” (King, 
2001: 344). Jean Guinet (ibid.) prefers to speak of experts by opposition to the notion of 
policy ‘peers’ used in the traditional OECD model: “the peers are the policymakers that 
populate the OECD committees. Experts are different, they combine two dimensions: to have 
previously held an important policy position in the domain, and to have reflected on research 
systems and policies. They thus have a “moral authority”, which plays an important role in 
the dialogues that take place during the visits, and in the ways countries consider their 
recommendations. Furthermore, the experts also played a broader learning role by 
discussing their analyses and recommendations in plenary sessions of the OECD committee”. 
Together, as mentioned by one expert, Harvey Brooks, (cited in Cohen, 1994), they 
constituted a small interlinked community. 
                                                
6 Interview, 18 October 2011 
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Who were these “experts”? An exhaustive analysis of the 16 first reports (covering 17 
countries, as there was a joint report for the UK and Germany) shows that 52 appointments of 
examiners were made (on average three per country) drawing on 44 individual experts. Four 
were ex-ministers including T. Lefèvre, the ex prime minister of Belgium and the first chair 
of the inter-ministerial conference, and Lord Bowden, ex British minister of State. Three had 
been heads of the administration in charge of science policy, including: J. Spaey from 
Belgium; P. Piganiol, the first French délégué général à la recherche scientifique et technique 
and the rapporteur of the powerful OECD report on science policy (1963), and A. King 
himself when he relinquished his role as head of the OECD directorate. All three were 
mobilised quite extensively (e.g. four times for P. Piganiol). One fifth of the experts had held 
positions advising Prime ministers and Presidents, or as chairs and members of national 
science advisory committees, coming from Belgium (J. Wautrequin), France (G. Ourisson), 
the Netherlands (C.J.F. de Böttcher), Sweden (B. Rexed), the US (Prof. Kistiakowski and 
Brooks) and the UK (C.H. Waddington, F.R.S. Willis Jackson). Heads of key public research 
organisations were an important third source of expertise (eight experts) including the heads 
of the research councils of Germany (Dr. Schneider) and Norway (R. Major) or the former 
director of the British Research and Development Corporation (The earl of Halsbury). The 
remaining experts, apart from some senior government officials, were either academics or 
industrialists in equal proportions. Six of the nine academics came from the US and the UK, 
most were or had been heads of universities or deans of their college / department. The 
private sector was also represented by heads of research and vice presidents of large firms 
(MM. Pennenborg and Casimir from Philips, Peccei from Olivetti, Morandi from 
Montecatini,  Massé from EDF, not forgetting P. Piganiol already mentioned that became the 
research vice president of Saint-Gobain). Interestingly three experts came from powerful 
consultancy companies (MM. Mesthene from Rand Corporation, Thiemann from Battelle and 
Michaelis from Arthur D. Little).  
This list speaks for itself about the “moral authority” of these experts. Their role was not to 
find new facts; they mostly relied on the initial background review. Rather it was to “question 
a broad range of people concerned one way or another with the national situation in science 
and technology” (King, 2001: 344). Jean Guinet (ibid) insists that evaluations were requested 
by the countries themselves, meaning that there were “national actors that wished to promote 
change”. In his view, the evaluation was there to “support national actors … and to be useful 
not provocative”. The experts can be seen as “visitors in a process of change, to which they 
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bring their different perspectives”. As we have seen in the above analysis of the functions, 
their reports were generally pragmatic often with very precise and sometimes quite detailed 
recommendations. As nobody “was allowed to modify” their report (King, 2001: 344), their 
analyses and recommendations were discussed by the countries, following the second central 
modification brought to the mainstream OECD process: the transformation of confrontation 
meetings into an open discussion.  
6.4 OECD instruments to foster a wide horizontal diffusion 
The confrontation meetings had become an important device in the diffusion of the model. 
During the learning period that lasted between the first and the third ministerial conferences, 
most confrontations took place within the framework of the Committee for Scientific 
Research (from 1966 the Committee for Science Policy). As mentioned in section 3, the 
meeting gathered “a team of representative policymakers from that country, frequently led by 
its science minister” (King, 2001: 344). The experts presented their analyses, including the 
‘good’ aspects of the situation, and their recommendations at the beginning of the meeting 
before the discussion started. They also prepared a list of questions for subsequent discussion.  
Although it had already been recognised very early on, and was reinforced after the review of 
the US, this approach made it increasingly clear that there was no single point of reference to 
follow. Rather references had to be built out of the experience of the member countries, with 
their different approaches to handle ‘similar’ issues: a central element of learning.  
A. King discusses the learning processes of both the evaluators and the policymakers: “the 
first few cases, when we were learning… were somewhat anodyne and superficial, but as our 
confidence and that of the member countries grew, the examinations became more profound, 
franker and constructively critical” (ibid, p. 345). Many of the members of the committee that 
have discussed its role (such as King) have placed particular emphasis on the critical learning 
dimensions linked to their activities: members from other countries were present and could 
discuss aspects that were also of special interest for their own countries both with other 
country representatives and experts. Borras and Jacobsson (2004) refer to on similar aspects 
when discussing the importance of the “open method of coordination” as a new governance 
mechanism. For this to take place, two conditions had to be fulfilled: there should be ample 
time for discussion within the meetings; and attendance should be large enough to generate 
these learning effects. For all meetings until the third ministerial meeting, the duration for the 
discussion for one evaluation was on average one full day (a sampling of further meetings 
held in the 1970s also witnessed such an average duration, e.g. for the Spanish confrontation). 
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Some meetings could include more than one confrontation meeting, as was the case for the 
May 1965 meeting, which lasted four full days (11-15 May). In this particular case, both the 
French and the Belgium confrontations took place and, we noted the German, Italian, Dutch 
and American delegations were significantly enlarged. Examining participations in meetings 
between 1962 and 1968 (table 2), the results are quite striking7: in less than seven years, 
almost 380 individuals from 22 countries were involved, with 47 being present on at least four 
occasions. On average, around 18 people per country for small emerging administrations 
represent a significant number, especially considering their positions: nearly all countries 
have sent their heads of administration or of their advisory council, at least once or twice; for 
some countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and 
the US), they have even been the ‘nodes’ of OECD presence, attending at least four of the 
eight meetings analysed. In a number of cases the ‘nodes’ are key actors within the national 
research landscape, being the heads of national research councils (Iceland, Norway, Sweden) 
or of important research organisations (Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands). Some 
countries have chosen a wide exposure of their national staff, Japan being typical with 33 
different individuals participating, and also to a lesser extent, Italy (25 different individuals). 
The larger countries, except France, have combined the different approaches (Germany with 
35 individuals, the US with 29 individuals and the UK with 39 individuals, coming on 
average twice for the latter two countries). To explore whether this knowledge could percolate 
to the highest level of policymaking, we examined the composition of the ministerial 
conference, in 1968 (OECD, 1968b). This was the case for 15 countries out of 21. 13 
countries were represented by at least one minister or secretary of state with two represented 
by their Prime or Vice-Prime Ministers (Belgium and France), three by at least two ministers 
(generally science and economic affairs: the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), the others 
being Germany, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. Two 
other countries were represented by high status representatives: Japan by the vice-minister in 
charge of the Science and Technology Agency and the United States by the director of the 
OST attached to the President. Also noteworthy is the participation of the European 
Commission as observer, represented by the vice-president.  
All these elements led us to conclude that potential learning effects were spread throughout all 
levels of the political and administrative structures of OECD members. This diffusion was 
further enhanced by the wide accessibility of the learning, through the systematic and 
                                                
7 Even though we did not count the participants to the second ministerial meetings (notes incomplete). 
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widespread circulation of the evaluations. The OECD systematically published the complete 
evaluations in the form of the series of ‘reviews of national science policy’, comprising the 
background report, the examiners report and recommendations, and the notes from the 
confrontation meeting that included the answers of the country and minutes of the discussions 
which took place. It is not possible to demonstrate de facto that they played a significant role 
in the ways in which countries understood the implicit OECD model and translated it in their 
national policy structures. However, following Radaelli (2004) and the differentiation he 
makes between hierarchical and bottom-up diffusion, we assume that this widely favoured 
horizontal diffusion. The latter helped the process of embedding of the model within the 
country and thus provided the rationale to request to be reviewed (as it was a voluntary 
choice) as well as the ability to absorb the recommendations made. Thus we argue that, 
contrary to Radaelli’s views about the OMC and its failure to promote ‘bottom-up’ learning, 
the OECD process was in his time, successful in promoting ‘bottom-up’ learning. 
Table 2 has been compiled from the minutes of all the review meetings between 1962 and 
1966, and includes all participants apart from country ambassadors and permanent 
representatives to OECD. Nodes represent the individuals that have each been present at least 
four times over the period. Titles have been translated into English and are those mentioned in 
the minutes8. 
 
                                                
8 The full Database is available upon request. 
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Table 2  - Country involvement in OECD committees and conferences on science policy 
Country Individuals Partici-
pations 
Nodes Key actors and their positions 
Austria 10 22 1 F. Grill, director, ministry of commerce 
Belgium 17 44 4 MM Deloz, Spaey, Wibail & Darimont, general 
directors (or equivalent) for research, higher 
education and economic affairs 
Canada 24 35 1 JD Babbitt, international affairs, National Research 
Council 
Switzerland 12 27 2 MM Fueter (Ministry of education) & Mercier 
(University professor) 
Germany 35 52 4 MM Schneider (Secretary General, 
Wissenschaftrat), Goerlich, Schreiterer & Lötz, 
ministry of research 
Denmark 9 16 1 T. Franck, director, research organisation 
Finland 3 4   
France 18 46 4 MM Maréchal (head) & Dumesnil (French 
Ministry of research, DGRST), Hameline 
(Ministry of industry) & Delaroche (CEA, research 
organisation)  
Greece 8 15 1  Caloyeras (university professor) 
Ireland 14 22 2 MM Cranley (director), & Barnes (researcher), 
National Institute for Industrial Research 
Iceland 3 8 1 M Hermannsson, director, National Research 
Council 
Italy 25 50 3 MM Sartori (NA), Lombardi (NA) & Scortecci 
University professor) 
Japan 33 37 0  
Luxemburg 3 8 1 Ministry of Education 
Netherlands 27 53 3 HW Julius (chairman of TNO), J Nittel 
(councellor, Ministry of education) & Stefels (head 
science policy coordination, Ministry of Education 
& Science) 
Norway 13 25 2 R Major (director of a national research council) & 
T Hernes 
Portugal 9 13 0  
Sweden 22 39 3 S. Brohult (chairman of a research council), G. 
Funke (Secretary of state) & B. Rexed, head of 
advisory council  
Spain 9 18 1 M Alvarez Osorio, Ministry of Education 
Turkey 15 23 1 B Karafakioglu, University professor 
UK 39 67 4 MM B. Blount (deputy secretary, Ministry of 
Technology), G. Brown, M. Vernon, Melville 
USA 29 56 5 MM DZ Beckler (OST, President office), A. Roe 
(int’l affairs NSF), CL Wilson (Professor, MIT), R 
Mayhew & R Strom 
Total 377 680 44  
OECD scientific 
division 
38 106 11 A. King (director) 
Members of secretariat:  MM Delsemme, 
Deutchbein, Gass, Harris, Langlais, Schmandt, 
Tôrnudd, Trugel, Vincent, Woodward 
 
6.5 Accounting for the national situation: the framing role of the OECD 
Following Radaelli’s discussion of the OMC (2003, 2004), this bottom-up diffusion was 
complemented by a more formal top-down diffusion process. The latter was first encapsulated 
in the background reports conducted under the authority of an “expert from the science 
directorate” and which followed a de facto preconceived format. Although there has been 
36 
some adjustment in the format, as knowledge was acquired through experience, the main 
components of the report remained remarkably stable until the beginning of the 1980s. When 
looking at contents, the reports addressed, in a consistent way, the same topics and issues. In 
broad terms, they provided an analysis of the ways in which the functions of this then 
‘implicit’ model were addressed and the policy structures that implemented them. Over time, 
these reviews clearly highlight ‘missing’ or ‘incomplete’ functions. For example, in the 
Portuguese review (OECD, 1986) the lack of horizontal coordination and of a research budget 
were highly criticised and suggestions made about how to implement them. Similarly, France 
(OECD, 1966c: 94), which was one of the first countries to adopt a research budget and had 
implemented a well-developed process, was criticized because the science budget included 
only civil non-nuclear research, omitting the large amount of research expenditure devoted to 
military and nuclear research. A. King underlines the importance of the quasi-standardised 
background reviews: they mirrored the annual examinations of economic situations and their 
established reputation. Doing so, they linked science issues to the important economic and 
financial government departments. This was confirmed by the first activity report of the 
science directorate (OECD, 1966a: 6), which noted that “the technique of country reviews is 
characteristic of the methods used by OECD to study question of economic policy, manpower 
or agriculture”. Freeman, subsequently (1987) argued that the shared approach (the model) 
enabled the growing claims by the ministers of finance for accountability and credibility in 
spending of public research funds to be addressed. 
This framework with which to examine a given national situation was further reinforced by 
the work undertaken within OECD to build what Piganiol in the 1963 report calls a sound 
'factual base' to support policymaking. Godin (Godin, 2007, 2008 and 2009) underlines how 
the work by economists on the production function, mostly on the 1950s and their use in the 
US political arena, was taken up by OECD at his inception and was organised into an input-
output framework. Through the work of C. Freeman, also capitalising on the seminal work of 
Bernal in 1939 (Godin, 2008), this framework was transformed into a manual (the Frascati 
Manual, first version 1962 specifying how to organise comparable data collection between 
countries. Godin highlights the two strengths underlining this process. It first enabled the 
level of outputs to be directly linked to the level of inputs (what became known later as the 
‘linear model’): “the more investment, the more growth”, (Godin 2009: 7) providing thus an 
impetus for public investment. Secondly, it enabled a “measure of leadership among 
countries” to be provided  (Godin, 2009: 9). One key element of the development of R&D 
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indicators was the articulation with a major post-world war II development, national accounts, 
and to the professional bodies in charge of providing them, the national statistical offices. 
Connecting both (the conceptual framework and its operationalization through the definition 
of a standard and the mobilisation of existing professional bodies) led to rapid development of 
country “factual bases”. By 1971, the OECD had produced a first comparative study. In its 
very title it states its aim of connecting what is with what should be: “R&D in OECD member 
countries: trends and objectives” (OECD, 1971d). It thus brings together the financial side 
and the need for a national science policy, reinforcing the strength of recommendations and 
the necessary policy structures.  
6.6 The diffusion of the OECD model: a synthesis 
This section has shown that the diffusion of the model is linked to two complementary 
dimensions: its conception as a model, and the processes put in place by OECD. The model 
has four central features that were already shared by most countries. They translate into the 
seven functions identified. However, as mentioned by administrators of the time, there is no 
need to formalise them, they provide a basis on which to analyse a situation. What counts are 
the policy structures that embed the functions. This way an adequate balance could be 
achieved between, on one side, the requirements of the model, and on the other, the past 
trajectory and national policy preferences of the country under evaluation. The evaluation 
process organised by the OECD secretariat constitutes the central operational mechanism 
through which the model was disseminated among members. The OECD secretariat used as a 
basis a practice that was already accepted and successful (Marcussen, 2001; Porter and Webb, 
2008). Its de facto standardisation provided a common framework to analyse a situation, 
which was further deepened by the progressive construction of national R&D statistics. 
However, in a situation where no reference model prevailed, the OECD secretariat adapted 
the classical reviews conducted under their responsibility by adding a further examination by 
authoritative experts that usually made practical recommendations on how to adapt policy 
structures so that a national science policy could be developed, extended or/and deepened. 
The organisation of confrontation meetings between the experts and the national authorities 
was a third element. It became all the more important that these meetings took place in front 
of all the delegations of other members. We have shown the extent of the learning process 
that derived from this practice, if only by the number and wide coverage of the national 
policymakers involved. Following Radaelli, we identified both horizontal and vertical 
learning processes, which, to our view, explain the speed at which the model diffused. A final 
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indicator for us is related to the requests by countries to be reviewed: in just one decade, 17 
countries requested and were evaluated at a time that corresponded, in most cases, to the 
initial implementation of a national science policy.  
7. Conclusions 
The aim of this article was to demonstrate that OECD acted as a policy innovator in 
developing and diffusing a model of science policy making to its member countries. This has 
been achieved following two main lines. First we have revealed the model that OECD 
promoted for science policy making. This model entails seven interlinked functions that are 
necessary for a country to develop and implement a fully-fledged science policy. Second we 
have proposed our interpretation of the changing role of OECD (compared to other sectoral 
policies) and of the means that enabled a ‘rapid’ adoption of the model through out OECD 
countries.  
7.1 The OECD model at a glance 
The model entails seven inter-linked functions that have endured and embraced the transition 
from science policies to science and technology policies in the 1970s, as well as the 
progressive shift of focus to innovation. 
Horizontal coordination corresponds to need for a national science policy to embrace all 
Government investments in science, whatever the implementation mechanisms used. The 
model does not reproduce classical sectoral policies where formulation and implementation 
are in the same department. Horizontal coordination recognises that implementation may be 
distributed among different sectoral ministries.  
Coordination relies on the formulation of national priorities. This requires that the central 
authority in charge of coordination requests and receives expert advice, and that plans are 
developed and priorities selected accordingly. These three functions play complementary but 
different roles. Advisory bodies have been promoted as an answer to the need of involving the 
different actors (what we call now stakeholders) in the definition of long-term orientations. 
Planning at the time was a central policy device for economic development, and, for science 
policy, it aimed, to articulate the science policy objectives in line with long-term national 
economic objectives. Although plans have disappeared, the function has remained in the form 
of forecasting and subsequently foresight activities. Priority-setting corresponds to the fact 
that countries cannot address all possibilities and need to identify priority areas on which to 
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focus their efforts. A 21st century expression of this function lies in the national strategies 
developed by most OECD members.  
Budgeting is the way to materialise horizontal coordination. It is thus considered as a critical 
function, and the existence of an annual science budget was a cornerstone of most reviews. 
Allocation of resources deals with the modalities of attribution of resources to researchers, 
discussing the balance between core and competitive funding. The model insists on the need 
for national programmes to address the national priorities, defined then as promoting the 
move from science to the development of technologies.  
The last function is of a different nature. For the previous functions to take place there are 
administrative requirements. The administration function translates in most reviews in the 
need to create a specific agency, that moves away from classical implementation structures, 
including research councils. This function needs to be professionalised and should also take 
charge of preparing the evidence needed for performing the different functions.   
7.2 Why and how OECD transformed its role 
 The role of the OECD and its modalities of operation have only recently been subject to 
scholarly investigation. They describe the OECD role as the promotion of new ideas and 
concepts, the diffusion of expert knowledge and the circulation of best practices from leading 
countries. They analyse OECD ways of working in terms of ‘peer pressure’. Peer pressure is 
linked to two intertwined mechanisms: periodic (mostly annual) reviews on the situation of a 
country performed by the secretariat, and the organisation of a forum enabling national 
administrators of the member countries to look at one another and to exchange.  
The OECD has been ready to play this role for scientific affairs since its inception. Its 
predecessor organisation, the OEEC, which was associated with the Marshall plan, had 
already put science on the agenda of economic development. However we argue that, because 
of the specific situation of public intervention in science, it had to play this role in a different 
way and to become a policy innovator. The need for this role relates to the absence of a point 
of reference (including the US) against which to benchmark activities. As demonstrated by 
the first OECD ministerial conference on science, very few countries had started to establish 
science as a national policy. OECD therefore set about to construct a policy model, based 
largely on the adaptation of prevailing mechanisms. We have highlighted four major aspects 
that explain the success of OECD in both developing the model and in ensuring its diffusion 
within member countries. First the directorate modified the frequency of reviews: countries 
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had to volunteer for a review to take place, meaning that there a number of actors in the 
countries were already convinced of the need for a national science policy. We have seen that, 
within one decade, 17 countries requested such reviews. Second, the directorate modified the 
process: the classical review by the secretariat only served as a background analytical 
document, and the evaluation and recommendations were carried out by a small panel of high 
level “experts”. The analysis of the 44 experts mobilised and of their generally influential 
positions highlights their credibility and moral authority. The systematic choice for pragmatic 
recommendations was another important aspect. For each function, we have illustrated how 
experts chose to embed their recommendations for change into evolutions or the creation of 
policy structures. Third, the secretariat organised confrontation meetings between the experts 
and country representatives within the context of a science policy committee that gathered 
together administrators from member countries. Again a detailed examination of participation 
focused on the extent of country participation, the variety of administrators involved and the 
participation for most countries of heads of their science administration. Fourth, the 
standardisation of background reports was an important mechanism for shaping analyses of 
the science and policy situations. It helped to harmonise views from member countries at a 
time when the Frascati-based indicators were not yet available, or were only just beginning to 
emerge.    
The conjunction of these different approaches explains in our view both how the model was 
built and how it was diffused. It also explains why the evaluations nearly disappeared after 
one decade: the model was embedded into policy structures, which, once in place, tend to 
evolve incrementally. Furthermore the evolutions both in the conceptual framework (moving 
from the ‘linear’ to the ‘system’ approach) and in the focus (from science to innovation) do 
not change the need for the functions, and thus the relevance of the existing structures. One 
can even speculate whether the 21st century focus on innovation associated with the post-
crisis constraints on public budgets does not reinforce some functions in particular horizontal 
coordination, priority-setting and budgeting. A final and surprising element is why the recent 
revival of country innovation policy reviews chooses to go back to the ‘classical’ mode 
skipping both the experts and the discussion within the present OECD committee for science 
and technology policy (CSTP)? One answer, that would require further research, is that the 
situation has radically changed with the growth of a new academic speciality, studies of 
41 
research and innovation policies9: OECD reviewers and policy administrators can find the 
references and benchmarks needed in the relevant academic literature. 
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